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I. Introduction
The International Bank has now been in successful operation for 25
years, and has made loans of $12.6 billions, mostly to the developing
countries, of which $5.6 billions are outstanding. Its operations and pol-
icies, under the Articles of Argreement proposed by the Bretton Woods
Conference of 1944, have been a significant factor in reopening in-
ternational financial markets, and have affected the lending policies of
governments and private investors, and have influenced the course of
development in its member countries. The Articles have served as models
for the creation of regional development banks, and the specific limitations
imposed by them have resulted in the creation of IBRD affiliates, the
International Finance Corporation, and the International Development
Association, which are subject to different provisions. In the last few years
the Bank has entered new fields, and has begun to shift its emphasis on the
type of work to be financed and the terms of financing. An analysis of the
negotiations leading to its creation should be of more than mere historical
interest.
Planning and negotiation occurred during the war, and were related
closely to other plans and negotiations with the allied countries looking
toward post-war reconstruction and the creation of permanent institutions
tThis article is a condensation of an unpublished study prepared for the IBRD while the
author was on detail from the U.S. Treasury as Consultant-Adviser. Neither the Treasury
Department nor the International Bank is responsible for the views expressed, or for the
accuracy of data.
*Prior to joining the Treasury in 1943, the writer taught Economics at Ohio State
University. In 1943 and 1944 he was a member of the "Technical Committee" which
formulated the U.S. proposals for the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank. He acted as Secretary of the informal drafting committee at Atlantic City and at
Bretton Woods was Secretary of Committee 2 of Commission ii on "Operations of the Bank"
and of various ad hoc committees and drafting groups. He is a graduate of Amherst College
(B.A. 1925) and of the University of Chicago (Ph.D 1932) and a member of the American
Economic Association, the Royal Economic Society, and the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors. He retired in 1969 as Associate Director of the Office of International
Financial Policy Coordination and Operations of the Department of the Treasury.
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for international political and economic cooperation, to assure the mainte-
nance of peace and the attainment of higher standards of living for the
world through the expansion of trade and investment under relatively
stable conditions of production and employment. The need for external
resources for the reconstruction of the war-torn countries was apparent;
the need for financing economic development was also clear; and the
expansion of trade and investment abroad would be important in pre-
venting a post-war slump in the United States. Domestic and international
objectives coincided.1
The resources needed were not likely to be forthcoming tinder the
conditions obtaining in financial markets. Prior to the depression, in-
ternational investment, other than direct investment, had been financed
mainly through the issue of bonds by governments and private entities. A
quite large portion of these bonds defaulted from 1931 to 1934, and were
still in default in 1944, so that American portfolio investment was prac-
tically confined to Canada. This background conditioned much of the
discussion of the forms and terms of guarantees by the Bank, though the
eventually agreed provisions have been virtually inoperative. Until
recently, when some bond issues have again been floated, the role of the
private investor, aside from direct investment, has been largely the pur-
chase of securities issued by the Bank and the regional banks, or the
purchase of participations in loans.
In 1943-4 no one could guess what the cost of reconstruction would be.
Development needs would almost certainly be as large as could be
financed. It was clear that much of the earlier investment had been waste-
ful. Borrowing had exceeded debt servicing capacity, though the depres-
sion precipitated the defaults. No one wished to repeat the experience. But
it was not at all certain that a slump and monetary chaos could be avoided
after hostilities ceased. Consequently a practicable plan had to allow for
alternative techniques and enough flexibility for adaptation.
The history of negotiation may conveniently be considered in four
phases: (1) U.S. interdepartmental discussion (1941-3); (2) informal in-
tergovernmental discussion of the Treasury's "Preliminary Draft Outline,"
November 24, 1943; (3) the Atlantic City Meeting of the Agenda Com-
mittee, June, 1944; and (4) the Bretton Woods Conference, July 1944.
II. Interdepartmental Discussion
There were few precedents for an International Bank. The existing Bank
'Cf. Press Release of U.S. Delegation, in PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, BRETTON WOODS, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, JULY 1944, Vol. 11, p. 1148 (Washington. Department of State, 1948, Publica-
tion 2866, 2 volumes) cited hereafter as B-W PROC.
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for International Settlements (BIS), was established in 1930 to deal with
certain aspects of the German reparations problem. The interested govern-
ments agreed with the Swiss Confederation that it would grant a charter to
a bank controlled by the central banks of these countries. The Swiss
government granted the charter which gave the BIS corporate personality,
specified its immunities, agreed to the Statutes formulated by the govern-
ments and central banks and also agreed not to modify the charter for
fifteen years without agreement.
2
The proposal for an Inter-American Bank 3 in 1940 came closer to the
IBRD project, though it was far wider in scope. The Bank was to make
investments, buy and sell securities of its members and their national, act
as a clearing house for international payments, make loans, guarantee
credits, discount bills, accept deposits and perform other normal banking
functions. The Bank was to sell its own debentures, borrow from govern-
ments and rediscount its paper with central banks or other governmental
institutions. The Charter was to be granted by the U.S. Congress, which
would grant corporate personality, privileges and immunities, give effect to
the operative provisions, and also agree not to modify the terms of the Act
without agreement for twenty years. The shares of the Bank were to be
held by the member governments, which would appoint their directors.
Voting was to be weighted by stock ownership plus a minimum of twenty
"country votes," but no member could have more than half of the votes.
Certain actions, including loan transactions, required a four-fifths vote,
which would, in practice, have given the United States a veto power since
it was expected to provide $25 million of the total share capital of $100
million.
The U.S. authorizing legislation provided for subscription to the stock
by the R.F.C. up to $25 million; the R.F.C. and Export-Import Bank could
purchase its obligations, and the Federal Reserve banks could effect trans-
actions for it on the same basis as for member banks or foreign banks. 4 The
U.S. director was to be appointed by, and receive instructions from, an
interdepartmental committee.
The proposal aroused considerable opposition in Congress and in the
2ELEANOR LANSING DULLES, THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS AT WORK,
(Macmillan, 1932), particularly Chapter V and Appendix with the text of the Hague Con-
vention, the charter, and the Statutes of the Bank. Three American institutions also had
shares, but not the Federal Reserve or the Government.3For a brief treatment of the Inter-American Bank proposal, and its relation to the genesis
of the IBRD, see RAYMOND F. MIKESELL, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1952) pp. 193-4.
4The full documentation is included in 76th Congress, 3d Session, Executive K, July 5,
1940, and in the Hearings on Executive K (Inter-American Bank) before the Foreign Rela-
tions Subcommittee of the Senate, May 5 and 6, 1941. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1940, V. 346-352; State Department Bulletin, May 11, 1940, pp. 512-525; Federal
Reserve Bulletin, June 1940, pp. 5 17-525.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
62 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
banking community. There were fears that the Bank would unfairly com-
pete with commercial banks in short-term credits, and that it might refi-
nance defaulted Latin-American bonds. 5 While the Convention and draft
legislation were sent to Congress by the President in July 1940, no hear-
ings were held until there were further discussions by the departments and
the banking community, and various compromise arrangements were
worked out. A hearing was held by the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate in May 1941, but no bill was reported, and the matter was trans-
ferred to the Banking and Currency Committee. No further action was
taken.
Phase 1. 1941-436
Within the U.S. government, studies of international political and eco-
nomic organization for the post-war period started with the outbreak of the
war. The Treasury had primary responsibility for the work on the in-
ternational financial institutions, the eventual International Monetary Fund
and International Bank, 7 though all the economic planning was interlocking
interdepartmental committees. In response to Secretary Morgenthau's
request of December 14, 1941, a memorandum fifteen days later proposed
an international stabilization fund and an interallied bank. This memo-
randum was elaborated and revised as a "proposal for a United Nations
Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the
United and Associated Nations," 8 which was circulated among the in-
terested agencies in April 1942.
Since the Rio Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics in January 1942 had adopted a resolution (XIV)
favoring the creation of international bodies to deal with monetary, devel-
opment, and trade problems, there was a well justified expectation that
Latin America would cooperate in the effort, though the membership of
other countries was essential to any effective international agreement.
President Roosevelt directed Secretary Morgenthau to continue the work
in consultation with other departments, and the plans were elaborated by a
"Technical Committee" (formally constituted by Presidential Memo-
randum in May 1943) which reported to the "Cabinet Committee."
The Treasury memorandum of April 1942 outlined a Bank project which
5Cf. Congressional Record, 1940, pp. 3171-8, 3350, 4032-5, 110-12, 5472, 5905, 6522.6 For a summary, cf, Statement by Secretary Vinson in House Banking and Currency
Committee, "Bretton Woods Agreements Act" (1945) pp. 160- 170.7Cf. State Department Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations 1939-1945 (1945) esp. pp.
141-2, 240-2.
8The portions relating to the Fund have been published in J.K. Horsefield, Editor, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945- 1965 (IMF 1969) Vol. 111, pp. 37-96.
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was far broader in scope than the eventual Bank proposal discussed wvith
the other governments. While it outlined much of what eventually appea"-d
in the Bank's articles, the proposed institution was expected to finance
relief as well as reconstruction, and trade as well as long-term capital
investment. It suggested the creation of subsidiaries of the Bank, or in-
ternational organizations in which the Bank would participate in providing
capital, to promote stability in the prices of basic commodities.
The Bank proposal was modified many times, and was not in form to be
given to other governments until the end of 1943. In the meantime, the
Bank was mentioned incidentally in some of the informal "technical-level"
discussions with the British, other Europeans, the USSR, the Latin Ameri-
can countries and China, which centered on the Fund proposal and the
alternative Keynes Plan. On October 5, 1943, however, Secretary Mor-
genthau appeared before a joint executive session of Senate and House
Committees concerned with foreign relations, finance and post-war policy
(183 members in all) to report on the conversations and gave them the then
"strictly-confidential" "Guiding Principles for a Proposed United Nations
Bank for Reconstruction and Development." With the favorable reaction
of the committees, the stage was set for international negotiations.
The notion of a Bank "was in the air" elsewhere at the time, since it was
recognized in Europe that reconstruction would need finance, and other
countries were anxious to restore the flow of capital for development. For
example, J. W. Beyen (Netherlands) argued that finance for reconstruction
and development was necessary for monetary reform, and that the U.S.
would be the main source of funds in the post-war period. 9 He envisaged a
multilateral organization to finance on appropriate terms, and international
agreements to protect private investments.
III. The November 24, 1943, Proposal
On November 24, 1943, the United States Treasury published a "pre-
liminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and
Development of the United and Associated Nations." The tentative nature
of this proposal was given by its title, and the preface underscored this
further by the statement that "it has not received the official approval
either of the Treasury or of this Government."
The preamble emphasized that investment capital should be provided by
9This was stated in a paper "Notes on Monetary Conditions after the War," dated 30
December 1942, given, at some subsequent time in mimeographed form, to the author. This
paper was also given to Keynes and some of the allied governments then at London. The
substance has been given in Money in a Maelstrom, pp. 147-8. (Letter of J.W. Beyen to the
author, May 9, 1966. The paper covered many other matters of trade and exchange policies,
monetary standards, etc.)
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private investment channels, but that it would be necessary, particularly in
the immediate postwar period, to encourage private investment by sharing
the risk, and by providing actual funds from the Bank as a supplement, so
that both direct loans and guarantees and participations in loans made by
private investors were contemplated.
The Bank was to have an authorized capital of $10 billion par, with
non-transferable shares of limited liability. Subscriptions were to be deter-
mined by a formula which might take into account such data as national
income and international trade, and would make the United States' sub-
scription approximately one-third of the total. Only 20 per cent of the
capital was to be paid in initially, and of this 20 per cent, a portion not over
20 per cent would be paid in gold, and the balance in the member's own
currency; but the ratio of gold and local-currency subscription would be
graduated for the members on a schedule taking account of their gold and
free foreign exchange holdings. Calls for additional capital subscription
would not be made unless they were needed for the operations of the Bank,
and not more than 20 per cent of the subscribed capital could be called
additionally in any one year. The countries were, however, to be required
to repurchase the Bank's holdings of their local currency with gold at a rate
determined by the growth of their monetary reserves, so that eventually it
would have had more usable assets.
The operations of the proposed Bank were set forth in considerable
detail, substantially along the lines eventually embodied in the Articles of
Agreement. The Bank could guarantee, participate in, or make, loans to
any member country, and through the government of such country to any
of its political subdivisions, or to business or industrial enterprises on
condition that: a-the national government fully guaranteed; b-the funds
could not be secured from other sources; on conditions deemed reasonable
by the Bank, even with the national government's guarantee; c-a com-
petent committee had made a careful study of the merits of a project or
program, and concluded that it would raise the productivity of the borrow-
ing country and that there were favorable prospects of repayment. This
committee, made up of Bank staff, was to include an expert selected by the
prospective borrowing country (who might be a member of the staff of the
Bank.); d-the Bank was to assure that the proceeds would be used only
for the purposes agreed; and e-that the Bank would guarantee, participate
in, or make loans only at reasonable rates of interest with a schedule of
repayment appropriate to the character of the project and the bal-
ance-of-payments prospects of the country of the borrower.
The Bank was to be authorized to guarantee, in whole or in part, loans
made by private investors and could participate in loans, subject to the
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conditions applicable to its own loans, except that the rates of interest
might be higher if the loans were made without the Bank's guarantee. The
Bank was also to encourage equity investment, by securing a member
country's guarantee of conversion into foreign exchange of current earn-
ings, and might also invest ten per cent of its paid-in capital in equities.
The Bank's loans were to be on an untied basis, and generally only for
foreign exchange cost; that is, the Bank was to impose no condition as
to the particular member country in which the proceeds were to be spent,
but a member country could object to expenditures in its territories. Local
currency costs were to be financed locally, though the Bank could, in
special circumstances, lend to the borrower in local currency the amount
required when it could not be financed at home "except on very unreason-
able terms." On the other hand, the Bank could provide part of the loan in
gold or in foreign exchange, if the development program of a given country
gave rise to an increased need for foreign exchange for purposes not
directly needed for the program, but resulting from it. Loans were to be
credited to the account of a borrower and payment was to be made only to
meet drafts covering audited expenses.
Interest was to be paid in currencies acceptable to the Bank, or in gold
on the amount actually withdrawn from the account. Principal could be
paid in acceptable currencies or in gold, though the Bank might agree that
the repayment of principal could be in gold or the currency actually
borrowed, at the option of the borrower. Moreover, in the case of an acute
currency stringency, the borrower could make payments of interest and
principal in local currency for periods up to three years, with arrangements
for the repurchase of this local currency. All payments of principal and
interest were to be made at gold value.
To protect the exchange position, as well as the business and financial
conditions of a country in which the proceeds were to be spent, the Bank
was to obtain the consent of the country concerned, and it could repur-
chase with gold or foreign exchange, a part of a loan expended in a country
supplying materials.
The proposed Bank could also make loans, or guarantee or participate in
loans, to international governmental agencies for objectives consonant with
the purposes of the Bank, provided that the majority of the members of
these agencies were also members of the Bank.
Subject to the approval of the member countries concerned, the Bank
could issue, buy or sell,. pledge or discount any of its own securities or
obligations or securities in its portfolio, or securities which it had guaran-
teed. It was to be authorized to borrow from member governments and
their fiscal agencies, central banks, stabilization funds, private financial
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institutions in member countries, or from international financial agencies. It
could buy or sell foreign exchange needed for its operations in consultation
with the International Stabilization Fund. It could also act as agent or
correspondent for the governments of member countries, their central
banks, stabilization funds and fiscal agencies, and could act as trustee,
registrar or agent in connection with the loans guaranteed, participated in,
or placed through the Bank. In its operations, except as otherwise pro-
vided, the Bank was to deal only with the governments of member coun-
tries, and their financial agencies, the International Stabilization Fund and
other international governmental organizations. It could, of course, deal
with the public when it issued its own securities, or guaranteed loans.
A member country defaulting on its obligations to the Bank could be
suspended from membership by a vote of a majority of the member coun-
tries, and the member governments and their agencies would agree not to
extend financial assistance to a suspended country without the approval of
the Bank. A suspended country would lose membership automatically at
the end of a year, unless it had been restored to good standing by a similar
majority vote of member countries.
The Bank was to have a board of directors composed of a director and
one alternate appointed by each member government for a period of three
years, subject to the pleasure of their governments. The board was to have
an Executive Committee, of not more than nine members appointed by the
board, to exercise the authority delegated by the board which could, by a
three-fourths vote, give the Committee the power to act on loan proposals.
The Executive Committee was to be continuously available at the office of
the Bank, and was to receive appropriate compensation. The board of
directors was to select a president as the chief of the operating staff of the
Bank. He was to be ex officio a member of the board for a term of four
years, but subject to removal for cause.
There was also to be an Advisory Council of seven members, not more
than one from any given country to consult with the Bank on matters of
general policy. The Bank could also appoint other committees and adviso-
ry committees. The Bank and its officers were to avoid interfering in the
political affairs of the member countries, and the Bank was not to be
influenced in its decisions on lending policies by the political character of
the government requesting a loan. The Bank officials, however, were to be
permitted to participate in the political life of their own countries. Any
member withdrawing voluntarily from the Stabilization Fund, or dropped
by it, was to lose membership in the Bank, unless there were a
three-quarters vote in favor of continuance. In case a country withdrew
from the Bank, its shares were to be repurchased at the price paid, in not
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more than five years, though if the Bank had realized losses at the time, the
loss was to be shared pro rata. One-quarter of the profits of the Bank was
to be added to surplus until the surplus equaled twenty per cent of the
subscribed capital. The balance was to be distributed in proportion to stock
holdings. It was to collect and make information available on its own
operations, and could make available general financial and economic in-
formation to the member countries and to the Stabilization Fund. More-
over, the member countries were to supply to the Bank the information
needed to facilitate its operations.
The Treasury "Questions and Answers" on the Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (January 24, 1944), were sent to the governments to
explain the rationale of the proposal. It was suggested that capital of $10
billion would support guarantees of $20 to $30 billion; paid-in capital could
be used for direct loans, and callable capital would back the Bank's guaran-
tees on security issues. The gold payment would enable the Bank to make
its payments in any currency since the loans were to be untied. The "Q and
A" emphasized guarantees, partial or complete as necessary, but always
with the reservation that direct loans would be made if private capital
would not finance directly with guarantees. Private capital could participate
in the work by buying Bank securities which might be more attractive to
investors. The main thrust of the argument was that the quality of loans
would be improved by restricting them to productive purposes in contrast
to the pre-depression bonds financing wars, budget deficits or refunding old
debts. With exceptions, loans were to finance foreign exchange costs with
local costs covered by local taxation or borrowing: "It is generally a grave
error to burden the balance of payments of a country with the servicing of
a foreign loan when the needed capital can be raised at home."
International Discussions
Informal "technical" discussions began almost at once. The reaction was
generally favorable, but significant differences in point of view were
presented. Naturally, the Europeans stressed reconstruction, the Lat-
in-Americans development. Aside from minor suggestions by various dele-
gations, there were proposals for loans for re-stocking inventories after the
war, gold loans for stabilization (Czechoslovakia), fear that governmental
guarantees would interfere with private business, and'so on. The USSR
group which carried on intermittent discussions between January and May
1944, wanted softer terms and reduced subscriptions for invaded countries;
they did not believe that the Bank should require general economic in-
formation, and they insisted that countries with state trading should receive
loans without prior investigation. Memoranda and informal discussion with
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the British brought out that they believed the Bank would be mainly
concerned with the guarantee of issues floated in the market, so that needs
for paid-in capital were small and that the direct loans as proposed would
in practice not be untied. These issues were not immediately resolved.
IV. Atlantic City, June 1944
President Roosevelt called the Bretton Woods Conference for July 1,
and a group of about 75 officials and technicians met at Atlantic City (June
19) as an Agenda Committee.'" Procedure was quite informal; there were
no official minutes;" subcommittees discussed, drafted andl redrafted pro-
posed Articles for the Fund and the Bank, and where tentative agreement
could not be reached, alternative wordings were prepared. Decision was
left to the full conference.
On June 24, the U.K. delegation proposed certain important modi-
fications of the U.S. proposal. (1) Only twenty per cent of the capital was
to be paid in installments with eighty per cent left callable to meet the
Bank obligations on guarantees or bond issues; (2) twenty per cent of the
paid-in capital was to be in gold, and the balance in member currencies
which could not be used in direct loans without specific consent; (3)
currencies borrowed by the Bank or received in repayment, and interest
were to be free of restrictions; (4) in addition to projects, the Bank could
loan gold or foreign exchange to a country to allow "a breathing space for
the recovery of its economy" and to establish its exchanges and balance its
international payments; (5) loans might be for as long as 30 or even 50
years; (6) interest was to be standard for all borrowers at a given time, and
the Bank was to charge an annual commission of one per cent on its loans
and guarantees; (7) commissions received were to be held in a special
reserve fund to meet Bank obligations; and (8) profits could not be dis-
tributed except by a three-fourths vote. The British draft also proposed
specific procedures for lending operations, and for the treatment of
defaults.
While the U.S. and other delegations felt that some of the British
proposals were too rigid, they were tentatively willing to accept certain of
them: the division of capital, the special reserve and the limitation on
dividends. The net effect of acceptance of the U.K. proposal was that the
Bank initially could make direct loans only from the gold payments, the
10Countries were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, France, Greece, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, U.S.S.R., U.K., and
U.S.A.
"Some members of the U.S. group took notes which were not put in final form until after
the Bretton Woods Conference, so that they may not be entirely accurate.
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U.S. subscription and funds borrowed here, since it was not expected that
European countries would permit the Bank to use their subscriptions or to
borrow in their markets for the period in which they took advantage of the
transitional provisions of the Fund Articles (XIV, 2) permitting them to
restrict current transactions.
The Atlantic City meeting worked out, in committees, the provisions for
organizational structure, and the privileges and immunities. The Atlantic
City Committee on Fund Organization proposed a Board of Governors
(plus an alternate) from each country, and a Board of Executive Directors,
some of whom "say, five" would be appointed by the major countries, and
six others would be elected for two-year terms by the Governors of the
others, with weighted voting in both bodies. It was assumed that the same
organization would apply to the Bank. There was no agreement in the
Committee on the responsibility of the appointed or elected directors to
their governments. 12
There was general consensus that the Fund and Bank should be exempt
from taxation and exchange restrictions, and that their assets should be
immune; that their officers should be immune for their official acts (cf.
Consular immunity); but that each member might tax the income of its
nationals employed by them.
On the basis of the Atlantic City discussions, the technical Secretariat
prepared full drafts of the Articles to be considered by the major confer-
ence.
V. Bretton Woods
A. Organization and History of the Bretton Woods Conference
There were 44 countries represented at the Conference by finance min-
isters, central bank governors, ambassadors and other officials, accom-
panied by technical staff. The U.S. Treasury, State and other departments
provided the Secretariat in accordance with custom.
The Conference was organized in three commissions. Commission II on
the Bank had four committees, though the Chairman, Lord Keynes, hoped
to speed up the work by establishing nine subcommittees to report directly
to the Commission. 13 Instead, it added to the confusion. Meetings of
committees were in progress on the Fund, and various committees and
12Atlantic City Document F. 6 "Report of the Committee on the Management of the
Fund," of which Sir Wilfred Eady was the chairman.
'
3The membership and terms of reference of these committees are given in B.-W. PROC.,
pp. 69-70, 252-257, 411-419, 489-490. The membership included the major countries in
each case, with only a few members from the smaller countries on each committee. Some of
the countries resented what appeared to be a "railroading" procedure.
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subcommittees met simultaneously. The smaller delegations lacked man-
power to attend meetings on all matters of interest; different members of
the same delegation lacked time to coordinate their positions. Commission
11 held an organizational meeting on July 3,14 but concentrated effort in
seven meetings from July I 1 to July 20, after the main issues on the Fund
had been clarified. There was some discussion in Commission I1, but it
mainly approved sections of the Articles as reported by the subject-matter
committees or the drafting committee, which proved to be the important
coordinating body. 15 On July 21, the Commission recommended the Bank
Articles to the Conference which approved them in the Final Act on July
23. The Conference ended with the signature of the Final Act, which was
then referred to the governments for action.
B. Main Issues on the Bank
Most of the controversy at Bretton Woods, as before and since, centered
on the operations of the Fund; and on many points when the issue was
settled for the Fund, the language could be adapted readily to the needs of
the Bank. There was no question about the need for the Bank, and the
issues concerned the respective roles of reconstruction and development,
and of direct loans and guarantees. On these issues there were strongly
opposing views.
The European countries16 were prospective borrowers during the re-
construction period, and later, lenders. They were, therefore, concerned
that their position should be protected in both roles. They naturally
stressed the importance of reconstruction loans in the initial period. Some
of them particularly favored loans for restocking their raw materials or
providing gold as reserves for currencies. Secondly, the European coun-
tries generally favored the guarantee approach. The inevitable tendency of
14There is a copy of the verbatim stenographic record of this session in the Treasury
library. it may not be entirely accurate, since the chairman conducted the meeting at such
speed that even the secretariat was confused. Some of the comments were inaudible to the
stenographer and the name or country of a speaker in some cases was unknown to the
stenographer. Either there were no stenographic records taken of the later Commission
meetings, or they have not survived.
15The drafting committee, with Dean Acheson as chairman, consisted of the U.S., the
U.K., the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, India, and Mexico.
16Throughout 1945 there were discussions between the United States and the United
Kingdom of a loan of very large proportions, which finally resulted in the Anglo-American
Financial Agreement of 1945, which, inter alia, provided for a post-war loan to the United
Kingdom, of $3,750 million, as well as additional loans arising out of the settlement of
lend-lease pipe line. There was a corresponding loan of $1.3 billion from the Canadian
government. These loans were of such magnitude as to take the United Kingdom out of the
class of borrowers from the International Bank. These loans, however, were not assured at
the time of the Bretton Woods Conference, and of course could not be counted upon until the
United States Congress took final action.
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direct loans would be for uniform rates of interest to all countries, those
with good, and those with bad, debt records. The guarantee method would
allow the market to differentiate, even though the guaranty of the Bank
might be essential to float issues. This point was particularly stressed by
the countries which had not defaulted on their publicly-issued bonds.
The less developed countries were more interested in development
loans, though they recognized the need for reconstruction in the initial
period. The Latin American countries as a whole had greatly increased
their monetary reserves during the war, since they had continued to export
their materials, while they were unable to purchase capital goods and other
manufactures because of war-time restrictions. The Sterling-area countries
had also acquired large holdings of Sterling which would eventually or
gradually be unblocked. These monetary reserves could be drawn down in
the immediate post-war period to finance imports of equipment, but the less
developed countries in all areas, realized that they would later need loan
financing. It was in their interest to secure funds at as low a cost as
possible. Since many of these countries were still in default in 1944, they
recognized that they would have great difficulty in borrowing on the private
market. Even if the defaults were remedied, they would probably have to
pay higher interest rates, even with guarantees. Hence they tended to favor
the direct lending method.
The position of the USSR was unique. It emphasized help to the coun-
tries whose economies had suffered the worst war damage. It opposed
more general use of the Bank's resources, and so objected to Article I(iv)
which provided for large and small projects, which would also involve
Bank study, appraisal and inspection. These devices were scarcely con-
sonant with the Soviet attitude on foreign or international observation
visits, though in 1944 the "Iron Curtain" Was somewhat less rigidly drawn
than later. Obviously the USSR could not expect to float bonds on private
markets. Aside from these inherent difficulties in the Russian position,
which expected more than "most favored nation" treatment in the Articles,
the delegation was handicapped by language. 17 It was the purpose of the
Conference, however, to seek agreement that would include the Soviets.
C. Evolution of the Bank Articles
Immediately following the Atlantic City meeting, the secretariat pre-
pared a full draft of the Bank Articles on the basis of its understanding of
27None of the principal members of the delegation had an adequate command of English,
so that the delegation had a large number of interpreters and translators. At the Committee
meetings, they were frequently unable to follow the rapid interchange of argument, or even the
decisions taken. One of their staff daily collected advance copies of minutes from the
committee secretaries, so that they could be translated for the information of the delegation.
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what represented a fair consensus. This draft was based essentially on the
original U.S. proposals and the British revision. Where it was necessary to
complete the draft on the Bank, on matters which had not been discussed
in detail, the materials were derived with appropriate modifications from
the drafts of the Fund articles. This draft was circulated on July 6. The
Agenda Committee of Commission 1I suggested that the member com-
mittees promptly submit any alternative drafts. These alternatives were
circulated without identification of the country, though the attitudes were
known from the Committee discussion.' 8
Only the most important issues can be mentioned here. For the reader
interested in particular questions it is desirable to use the final Articles in
conjunction with the index of the proceedings.
1. TITLE
The first Bretton Woods draft referred to the "Bank for Reconstruction
and Development." The term "Bank" raised considerable objections. The
British and some others felt the the designation of "Bank" was in-
appropriate, as it would not receive deposits and make loans in the usual
banking fashion, since they regarded the primary function as being the
guarantee of loans made by private investors. Other possible names were
offered but met with objections, so that "Bank" was retained, for want of a
better word.' 9
2. PURPOSES OF THE BANK
The original "purposes" clauses proposed by the U.S. were modified
somewhat to include other views. The USSR wished to state, as the first
purpose, "to assist in the reconstruction and the restoration of the econo-
my destroyed by the hostilities."'20 Mexico proposed that development be
the first purpose with reconstruction as an aim only "during the first
post-war years." Venezuela and Mexico proposed language for equitable
treatment of both types of loan. 2 ' New Zealand wished to stress high levels
of employment. The U.S. language of making loans "on conditions which
amply safeguard its funds" seemed too conservative for the British, so that
"on suitable conditions" was substituted. 22 The final language resulted
8 1n the published form of the proceedings, there is an index originally prepared in the
Treasury and later enlarged by staff members of the IMF and IBRD, and edited by the State
Department. This index indicates the country submitting various amendments. In a large
number of instances, the country submitting an amendment wished to have its name identified
with it and so circulated it as a separate document.
19B. W. PROC. p. 1101.20B. W. PROC., p. 367.
21B. W. PROC., p. 488, July I I meeting of Commission i.
221d., p. 367.
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from a revision of a joint U.S.-U.K. redraft, which included the various
suggestions. 23
3. MEMBERSHIP AND CAPITAL (ARTICLE 11)
a. Membership
At Atlantic City, Australia had questioned the requirement that Bank
membership be limited to Fund members. The Bretton Woods Committee
noted the objection that a country's freedom of action would be limited if
membership in one organization were contingent upon membership in
others-there were several other international organizations under consid-
eration at the time: the U.N., FAO and ITO-but retained the clause
on the ground that similar clauses would probably not apply to the other
organizations which would be less closely related. 24
b. Capital
There was no problem about the statement of capital in terms of gold
dollars. An increase of capital by a four-fifths vote (U.S. proposal) was
reduced to a three-fourths vote. Either provision gave the U.S. an effective
veto over increases which might dilute the shareholders' equity and voting
power.25
Individual country subscriptions (Schedule A) were closely related to
Fund quotas. While Fund quotas measured the members' drawing rights as
well as their contribution of assets, there was no necessary relation be-
tween a member's Bank subscription and the amount of loans it might
receive. The subscription, however, involved a contingent liability on Bank
obligations. Hence a country might want a large Fund quota and a small
Bank subscription. In both cases, there was an element of prestige and
voting rights.
The complex Treasury formula for IMF quotas was the starting point
of bilateral U.S. discussions with the larger countries from 1943 on, and
substantial agreement was reached. Once the U.S. quota was set, the
practical issue was relative drawing rights, and the broad groupings of
voting strength, for Latin America, the Sterling area, Continental Europe
and, of course, the USSR. At Bretton Woods, quota discussion continued
parallel to the formal conference, and the official quota committee's report
was largely pro forma.
The Treasury had offered a simpler Bank formula based on national
income and trade,26 but this was abandoned in view of the prolonged
231d., pp. 568, 613, 1016, 1050.
2ad., pp. 369, 347, 613.
25id., pp. 549, 715, 838, 1017.
261n the draft outline and Q. and A.
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argument over Fund quotas, and Bank subscriptions became modified
Fund amounts.2 7
The Latin American caucus tried for a Bank subscription of sixty per
cent of IMF quota. The USSR would not at first agree to more than 75
per cent, though at the close of the Conference it agreed to an equal
amount on instructions from Moscow. 2 8 The impasse was broken by agree-
ment of the U.S. to a Bank subscription of $3,175 million compared with
$2,750 million in the Fund. Canada and China also took somewhat larger
shares of the Bank. The larger Latin American countries took subscrip-
tions of 70 per cent, and the smaller, 60 per cent. Greece, Yugoslavia and
Ethiopia received substantial reductions. and there were smaller reductions
for Iran, Egypt and Iraq. For the other members, their shares in the Bank
and Fund were equal.
There was some disagreement on the terms on which the members were
to pay in their subscription. The U.K. proposal of twenty per cent paid-in
capital, and eighty per cent callable was accepted readily. The U.K. draft
provided that the portion of paid-in capital to be made in gold and member
currency would vary with a member's gold and foreign exchange holdings,
and this was later modified to provide for gold payments of ten to twenty
per cent. The USSR favored a reduction of the gold payment for ene-
my-occupied countries. It was finally agreed that two percent should be
paid in gold or dollars (avoiding the gold-convertible currency phrase of
earlier drafts) and eighteen per cent in member currency, with a deferment
of part of gold-payments for the occupied countries and full postponement
for countries which had not recovered their gold reserves. The Committees
also worked out the final provisions for the timing of payments (Art. I1,
Sec. 8).
The drafting committee also recommended that the maintenance-
of-value (II, 9) be applied only to subscriptions, and not to currencies held
by the Bank as the result of borrowings, repayments or earnings.
4. Provisions on Loans and Guarantees (Article 1II)
While the broad outlines of Bank lending policy were agreed there was
considerable divergence of view on details. Only the salient issues are
covered here. The controversy about reconstruction versus development
resulted in the language "equitable consideration" which left the matter to
discretion, with, however, special consideration of countries suffering from
occupation or hostilities ( 11, 1).
27The Bank Articles (Schedule A) refer, in a footnote, to the "quota" of Denmark.28B. W. PROC., p. I I 11.
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The first Conference draft had provided for a limit to Bank loans and
guarantees as a percentage of capital and surplus, but the percentage was
left blank. The Treasury "Q. and A." suggested 200 or 300 per cent, in
analogy to banks. At one extreme, Norway proposed 500 per cent, and
was supported by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Cuba. At the other extreme,
the Netherlands proposed that Bank guarantees or bond issues should not
exceed 75 per cent of the callable subscription and would have required the
holding of currency deposits or gold sufficient to cover six months' debt
service. The U.S. delegation was divided. Some even favored guarantees
with a partial reserve. The clinching arguments were that the financial
market would rely only on the U.S. subscription; that Congress would not
agree to an open-ended commitment; and that if the Bank were successful,
capital could be increased to permit further bond issues. 29 Though other
compromise ratios had been suggested, the Committee and Commission
adopted the 100 per cent figure.
30
The original U.S. draft provided that the Bank could lend or guarantee
loans to governments, political subdivisions and business and individual
enterprises subject (1) to guarantee by the government, Central Bank or
comparable agency; (2) inability of the borrower to secure funds under
conditions deemed reasonable by the Bank; (3) a favorable Committee
report; (4) a reasonable rate of interest and term of repayment appropriate
to the project and the balance of payments prospect of the country; and (5)
in the case of guarantees, compensation to the Bank for its risk. The U.K.
draft added public utilities, semi-public bodies and agricultural coopera-
tives and credit institutions. It also favored "breathing-space" loans of gold
or foreign exchange in agreement with the IMF. It also argued that the
Bank ought to take some risks on individual loans though its operations as
a whole should avoid calls on capital. 3'
There were several variations suggested, including the Netherlands'
proposal of loans to private entities without governmental guarantee but
with governmental approval (rejected at Bretton Woods, but the basis of
the later International Finance Corporation).
The question of agricultural loans, to which as such there was no
objection, however raised procedural issues. The Interim Commission on
Food and Agriculture (later FAO) proposed a variety of agricultural loans,
including cooperatives and credit institutions. It wished to consult with the
Bank and make recommendations on loans, and to have the Bank appoint
29Delegation meetings of July 1. 13, 19, 1944. Cf. Judge Vinson's statement in House
Hearings, p. 167.3 0B. W. PROC., pp. 701, 859.
311d., pp. 375-378.
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an agricultural vice president from a panel nominated by FAO, who would
consult regularly with it.32 Committee 2A readily agreed to include agricul-
tural enterprises along with business and industrial enterprises, and report-
ed that the words would include public utilities and railways and would not
exclude agricultural credit and cooperative institutions. Committee 3A,
which dealt with relations with other international organizations, gave a
wider interpretation and also recommended more general language for
inter-agency consultation. After debate in the Commission, the question
was referred to a special committee which recommended the text now in
the Articles, and further recommended "that in the future the reports of
subcommittees avoid interpretative qualifications of text submitted, and
suggests that only text reported and adopted shall be regarded as author-
itative." 33
The U.K. and Czechoslovakian delegations proposed loans of gold or
foreign exchange for monetary stabilization purposes and also restocking
loans. The U.S. delegation objected to direct stabilization loans and em-
phasized specific projects. Compromise language was adopted to the effect
that loans were to be for projects "except in special circumstances," with
the effect of giving the Bank wider discretion and allowing for differing
interpretations. Lord Keynes believed that the phrase covered his pur-
poses.34 The U.S. Treasury, later in the Congressional hearings, stated that
the phrase covered stabilization loans.3 5
The question of guarantees by Central Banks for countries without such
banks was settled by the phrase providing for guarantees by governments,
central banks, "or some comparable agency of the member which is ac-
ceptable to the Bank." (1II, 5.i)36
5. Operations (Art. IV)
The work at Bretton Woods on the operations of the Bank consisted
mostly of tightening the language of the earlier drafts. The distinction
between loans made from funds corresponding to capital and surplus, and
from borrowed funds, was sharpened. The members could (and with the
exception of the U.S. and some smaller countries, did) control loans made
from their own subscriptions, while loans made from borrowed funds were
to be completely untied, as were guaranteed loans. Subsection b of Section
I was redrafted to require not only the consent of the member in whose
32 B. W. PROC., pp. 466-481.
331d. pp. 629- 30.341d. p. 63 1.35House Banking and Currency Committee Hearings, "Bretton Woods Agreements Act"
(1945) p. 122.36 B. W. PROC., po. 630.
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markets the Bank borrowed, but also of the country in whose currency the
loan was denominated if different (cf. Euro-dollars), to safeguard against
the contingency that the currency of denomination (e.g., dollars) might
become scarce under the Fund Articles, so that exchange restrictions could
be applied to it. Restrictions were not to be applied to the use of borrowed
funds nor to repayments. In contrast, use of repayments from loans made
in subscribed member currencies were to be subject to the approval of the
member. 37 This was qualified only to the extent that such funds could be
used to meet obligations after all of the 80 per cent capital had been called,
a contingency which could arise if some members did not pay on the calls.
Section 2(c) admits of an ambiguity which was later resolved by in-
terpretation. Under the general caption, "availability and transferability of
currencies," it provides that repayments of principal on loans from bor-
rowed funds "shall be held and used, without restriction by the members,
to make amortization payments, or to anticipate payment of or repurchase
part or all of the Bank's own obligations." This could be construed to
require the Bank to use amortization payments only for debt retirement
and not for relending, a sensible construction if the Bank borrowed a
specific amount for a specific loan, but unduly restrictive if it borrowed in
global amounts. If the emphasis is placed on "without restrictions," relend-
ing would not be precluded. The latter interpretation was made by the
Executive Board. 38
Payments on loans would consist of interest, commission and amortiza-
tion (IV, 4). Interest on direct loans would obviously depend on the cost of
money to the Bank. The U.K. draft provided for a uniform rate of interest
to all borrowers at a given time, an annual commission of one per cent on
the original principal of the loan and amortization generally in less than
thirty years.39 In the case of guaranteed loans, the Bank would receive the
commission and the lenders the other payments. Commissions were to be
impounded in a reserve fund to be held to meet obligations in the event of
default by the borrowers (IV, 6). The argument was over the rate. Norway
proposed a variable rate depending on risk, from .25 to .5 per cent, the
USSR between .5 and 1.0 per cent. The Netherlands favored charging the
commission only on the outstanding balance of a loan.40
It was argued that a differential would further weaken the position of
37 1n this section, the author has used his "Confidential Report of the Work of Committee
2 of Commission 11, July 12-18, 1944" (written after the Conference, now declassified) to
supplement the printed record which does not report the arguments.38Decision of June 18, 1947 (lBRD. Second Annual Report, p. 39.) There appears to be
no record, official or unofficial, of the reasoning behind this subsection.
39 B. W. PROC., pp. 381-3.40 1d. pp. 383, 440, 918.
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weak countries, and that the Bank could not assess the relative credit of its
members (Keynes), though the rate might be varied after the Bank had
actual experience. The U.S. favored discretion on loan terms in view of all
of the uiknowns, but recognized that the Bank would probably have to
charge the same commission and interest to all members at a given time.
The compromise reached was that for ten years the rate should be between
I and 1.5 per cent on the outstanding amount, but that thereafter the Bank
could increase or decrease the rate (IV, 4(a)).
Since the subscribed capital of the Bank had to be maintained in gold
value, the question arose as to the use of a gold clause in loan contracts. If
the loan contract specified repayment in a given currency on a loan made
from subscription, the burden would fall on the subscribing member in the
event of devaluation. If the loan contract contained a gold mainte-
nance-of-value clause, the Bank's capital accounts would be unimpaired.
and there zwould be no burden on the country whose currency was being
used, so that it would more readily permit the use of its subscription.41
Some countries objected to any gold clause in loan contracts, and others
favored specification of loans in terms of dollars, which would be the case
for most of the loans in any case, since they would be funded from the U.S.
subscription or borrowings in the American market. The United States
preferred not to have the dollar specified in view of the multilateral charac-
ter of the institution. The compromise arrived at (IV, (b)(i)) was that the
Bank, by a three-fourths vote, could specify the currency in which value
was to be maintained.
Different conditions applied to loans made from borrowings. The Bank's
obligations would be stated in particular currencies, and legally could not
have gold clauses in the United States and other countries. If individual
loans corresponded to specific borrowing there would be no exchange risk.
Since the Bank probably would borrow in global amounts, the Articles
provide that loans in any given currency should not exceed borrowing in
that currency.
6. Organization and Management (Article V)
The organizational structure of the Bank was derived, with a few neces-
sary modifications, from the Fund agreement, perhaps with inadequate
recognition of the functional differences, since the Bank had no regulatory
functions and loans would not require the speedy action involved in ex-
change matters. The debate before, at, and after Bretton Woods centered
411n the background was the recognition that sooner or later the European currencies
would be devalued.
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about the Fund, the necessary qualifications of directors, the role of man-
agement and country representatives, the interests of geographical areas
and of small and large countries, and the need for speedy action in matters
of drawings and exchange rate changes.
From the Atlantic City discussions, a consensus emerged that the IMF
and IBRD should each have a supreme authority, the Board of Governors,
on which each member should be represented with voting strength based
on subscriptions and "country votes," and a smaller board of Executive
Directors, also with weighted votes. As finally agreed, the Bank was to
have five Executive Directors appointed by the countries with the largest
shares, and seven elected by the others. No special provision for Latin
American directors was made, as in the Fund, and the issue was not raised
since these countries expected to be debtors to the Bank and their shares
were smaller.
Other organizational matters will be mentioned only briefly. The presi-
dent, appointed by the Executive Board, and staff were to be international
civil servants (V, 5). The Bank and its officers were not to interfere in
political affairs of members, "nor shall they be influenced in their decisions
by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions..." (IV, 10).
While these phrases were probably intended principally as reassurances to
the USSR, they have in practice had wider application.
Certain powers were reserved to the Governors: admission and ex-
pulsion of members, agreements for cooperation with other international
organizations, deciding appeals from interpretations made by the Exceutive
Directors, and increasing capital or liquidating the Bank. These are mainly
political issues involving the right of all members, and therefore not to be
taken by the "non-political" directors. There was to be an outside Adviso-
ry Council, representing various broad economic groups. (After the Bank
was in operation, this proved to be a nuisance and was dropped.)
The U.S. draft for the Bank provided for the location of its main office
in the country with the largest shareholding. The British wished to post-
pone this decision until the first meeting of the Governors, 42 when account
could be taken of the location of the U.N. and other agencies under
discussion. The U.S. delegation believed that Congress would not support
a location outside the United States, which would be providing most of the
usable resources of the Bank and Fund. This view was strongly supported
by the Latin Americans and approved by the majority, though the British
only reluctantly agreed. 43 There was no problem about the establishment of
42B. W. PROC., p. 392.
'aId., p. 825.
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branch offices for operational purposes. The Committee in charge also
recommended regional offices advised by regional councils, to give greater
scope to the countries not directly represented by their nationals on the
Executive Board. This proposal was modified to permit, but not require,
the Bank to establish regional offices (V, 10). Regional offices have not
been established, but regional Banks were created subsequently.
To save interest costs, the members could substitute non-negotiable,
non-interest-bearing notes for their subscriptions in national currency (V,
12). While some countries favored distribution of earnings as dividends,
others were more concerned that the Bank should build up a surplus as
protection against demands on the callable capital. The compromise
reached was to leave the matter to the Governors, with the proviso that if
there were dividends, there would be a non-cumulative preferred dividend
of two per cent on the amount of subscription used in loans 44 (V, 14).
There is a section headed "publication of reports and provision of
information" (V, 13) which covers financial and other reports, but lacks
provisions for members to supply information to the Bank, parallel to the
requirements of the Fund Articles (VIII, 5). It is not apparent whether
there was expectation that agreement could be reached on the types of data
to be provided to the Bank, or that the Bank could obtain all needed
information in connection with loan applications, so that there was no
occasion for specific requirements. 45
7. Withdrawal, Suspension of Members, Suspension of Operations and
Liquidation (Art. VI)
There was little argument about the right of a member to withdraw at
will, or of the rights of the Bank to suspend a member failing in its
obligations (e.g., default). The final decision was that suspension should
require a majority of the Governors and a majority of the votes.46 The
provision of the U.S. draft, that members would not extend financial
assistance to a suspended member, was dropped. The requirement that
suspension from the Fund would automatically involve suspension from
the Bank reopened the controversial issue of joint membership. It was
"Two per cent was the computed annual interest cost of the U.S. Treasury at the time.
No dividends have been paid to date, and the U.S. would have been the main beneficiary.
4This problem has arisen in the IBRD collection of data on indebtedness of member
countries. The creditor countries supply statistics and loan data on a voluntary basis. The
USSR strongly opposed provision of information to the Bank in pre-Bretton Woods dis-
cussions and agreed to the Fund requirements only after the conference took a day's recess to
await a reply from Moscow.
4B. W. PROC., pp. 395, 600, 734, 1033-4.
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finally agreed that suspension would be automatic after three months un-
less the Bank decided to the contrary by a three-fourths vote (V, 3).47
Settlement of accounts with a suspended or withdrawing member relates
to the circumstances. The member would have a contingent liability on
callable capital in any case, and if it had borrowed, a direct liability. In the
case of voluntary withdrawal, the holders of Bank bonds would have their
security diminished unless the member's contingent liability continued in
effect, e.g., if the United States withdrew after the Bank had issued bonds
or guarantees. If a country were suspended (for default) the liability to the
Bank could not readily be liquidated. If a country were suspended by the
Fund, there might be no direct connection with its Bank obligations.
It was finally agreed that the withdrawing member would be paid the
book value (including surplus), but that payment could be held up until
liabilities were satisfied. If it had no direct liabilities it would be paid off,
but would continue to have a liability for its pro rata share of the capital on
obligations in existence at the time of withdrawal, and if losses were
incurred subsequently it would be liable for its pro rata share. 48 Moreover
if the Bank went into liquidation within six months after a member's
withdrawal, the liquidation rules would apply. For example, if the United
States withdrew, the Bank could not operate in the immediate post-war
period, or if other countries withdrew because of war or economic collapse.
The Executive Directors could suspend operations and the Governors
could, by a majority of the members with a majority of votes, put the Bank
into liquidation. Before any distribution of assets to the members, the
Bank's liabilities on security issues were to be paid out of assets and calls
on capital, and arrangements made to cover contingent liabilities on guar-
antees.
8. Privileges and Immunities (Art. VII)
Most of the discussion on the legal privileges and immunities took place
with regard to the Fund, and the Fund provisions were adapted to the
Bank except in the matter of legal process. At Atlantic City the Committee
considered the issues in terms of extra-territoriality, or a limitation to those
immunities as were necessary for the functioning of the organizations. No
final conclusions were reached but the latter view predominated. Repre-
senting this view the U.K. at Bretton Woods submitted a memorandum
covering the points incorporated in the Fund articles. 49 Unlike other in-
471d., pp. 396, 546-8, 624, 642, 705, 734-5, 749, 821, 855, 1034, 1068.48B. W. PROC., pp. 210, 397, 749-51,821-2, 1034-5.
49B. W. PROC., pp. 421-423.
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ternational organizations which derived their immunities from the legisla-
tion of the country where located (e.g., BIS), or from specific agreements
between the organization and the host government, the Bank and Fund
agreements specified the particulars and provided that they were to be
"accorded to the Bank in the territories of each member," which would
take the necessary legal action "in terms of its own law" and would inform
the Bank of action taken 50 (VII, 1, 10), so that diversity of legal systems or
constitutional procedures could readily be accomodated.
The Bank has "full juridical personality." Unlike the Fund which is
immune to legal process except when it waives its rights, the Bank may be
sued in the courts of members in which it has offices or has appointed an
agent for the purpose or has issued or guaranteed securities, but its assets
are immune before final judgment. Its assets are otherwise immune from
restrictions, search, requisition or expropriation or other form of seizure.
Its archives are inviolable. Each member must accord Bank commu-
nication the same treatment that it accords official communications of other
governments. 5a Officials of the Bank are immune from liability for official
acts (unless waived) and must be accorded the privileges given to corre-
sponding officials of governments in such matters as national service obli-
gations, registration and exchange restrictions, unless they are nationals of
the country concerned. The Bank is not subject to tax, or liability to collect
taxes. A member may not tax the salaries of Bank employees who are not
its own nationals. Discriminatory taxes may not be levied on Bank secu-
rities or income from them, or on securities guaranteed by it.52 Aside from
drafting changes there was practically no argument on these matters. 53
9. Amendments (Art. VIII)
The amendment provisions of the Bank Articles were based on Fund
discussions. Two steps are required, a majority vote by the Governors, and
acceptance by three-fifths of the member governments having four-fifths of
the voting power. This provision would prevent amendment by the larger
50Some gave the force of law to the specific provisions, others made the agreements part
of their law, and others published the text of the Articles in recognition of its binding effects.
(Cf. Hans Anfricht, The International Monetary Fund, pp. 10-12.) The United States (Bret-
ton Woods Agreements Act, pp. 79-171) was in the first group, but the Articles are reprinted
annually with the Act in Legislation on Foreign Relations.
"
1 This clause subsequently became a matter of interpretation and legal proceedings in the
United States on the matter of telegraph rates.
52This brief sketch of the negotiations does not purport to be a full legal analysis of the
immunities, and the precise language of the Articles has been summarized. Cf. Aron Broches,
"International Legal Aspects of the Operations of the World Bank," Acad~mie de Droit
International, Recuei des Cours, 1959, (Leyden, 1960), pp. 296-408.
53B. W. PROC., pp. 213, 559-60, 735-6, 856-7.
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members over the opposition of the smaller, but also prevent the smaller
countries carrying an amendment over the wishes of the larger. The Arti-
cles may not, however, be amended to modify the right of withdrawal, the
right of the member to subscribe to additional capital (or to refuse), or to
eliminate liability on callable capital, without unanimous agreement. 54
10. Interpretation (Art. IX)
The Executive Directors, subject to an appeal to the Board of Gover-
nors, may interpret the Articles if questions are raised by members. In the
case of a disagreement between the Bank and a former member, or during
suspension of the Bank, when the Bank Board could not be expected to be
impartial there would be an arbitration with an umpire appointed by the
president of the International Court of Justice or other authority prescribed
by Bank regulation. The last clause was necessary because of the prospec-
tive changes in the Court.55
FINAL PROVISIONS (ART. XI)
The signature of the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference au-
thenticated the text of the Articles of Agreement, which then required
action by the governments before they could become effective. The Arti-
cles were to enter into force when countries with at least 65 per cent of the
subscriptions had deposited their instruments of acceptance, each certify-
ing that it had taken the necessary steps in accordance with its law. It
could not, however, become effective before May 1, 1945, and it would
remain open for signature until December 31, 1945.
After entry into force, each country was to appoint its governor, and the
country with the largest subscription would call the first meeting to select
provisional Executive Directors to hold office until the first regular election
after January 1, 1946.
SEQUEL: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO 1818 H. STREET
The Fund and Bank Articles were promptly published, explanatory
pamphlets and articles written in technical and popular journals, and vigor-
ous discussion took place in business, financial, political, civic and labor
circles in the United States. Meetings were numerous and there were even
radio broadcasts on the proposal. There was strong support for the propos-
als in most of these groups, but also significant opposition to the Fund in
5 4There have been no amendments to the present.55 lnfra, p. 85. It has not been necessary to use this procedure in the few cases of
withdrawal.
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some parts of the business and financial community. There was little
opposition to the Bank.
There was a parallel discussion in Great Britain where some feared that
the Fund would tie the country to the gold standard, that the fixed ex-
change rates would restrict social programs, and that the multilateralism of
the Articles constituted an attack on the Sterling Area and the Empire.
Since acceptance of the Fund Articles by these countries was crucial for
the acceptance by other members, the discussions in Congress and Parlia-
ment determined the outcome of the Bank.
U.S. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION
An important degree of Congressional support had been assured by the
inclusion of the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Senate and
House Banking and Currency Committees in the U.S. delegation, in which
their views were given great weight. At their suggestion, hearings were
postponed until after the 1944 election. The hearings ran from March to
May 1945, and included 1334 pages of testimony and documentation, 56 of
which only a few related to the Bank, to which there was little opposition. 57
The Executive Committee of the American Bankers' Association, and
the Finance Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, favored
acceptance of the Bank and deferment of action on the Fund. The Com-
mittee for Economic Development believed that the Fund could not func-
tion properly in the post-war period, and that the Bank's functions should
be enlarged to enable it to make long-term stabilization loans. Similar views
were expressed by others.58
The Treasury spokesmen before the House Committee argued that the
Bank Articles contemplated the possibility of stabilization loans under the
"special circumstances" of Article III, Section 4-vii, and that the Bank's
resources could be used to provide inventories of commodities as part of
reconstruction loans. 59 The Committee believed that a more clear-cut
56House Banking and Currency Committee hearings, Bretton Woods Agreements Act,
Act, 2 Volumes. Cf. The Committee Report on H.R. 3314. There is a summary of the
hearings and unofficial comment as well as press comment in the Report of the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, Participation of the United States in the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (79 Cong.
1. Sess. H. Report, 629, May 30, 1945, 124 pp).57 Professor Kemmerer opposed Bretton Woods since it did not provide for a gold
standard. Another witness believed that the Bank's operations should be limited to countries
adopting a gold standard. A third believed that the Bank would not promote monetary
stabilization, and that its functions in the area of reconstruction and development finance
could be better handled by the Export-Import Bank. Another writer proposed that the
functions of both the Fund and the Bank be transferred to the BIS. (Hearings, pp. 850-1,
1182, 1051, 1088).5 8
"House Hearings," pp. 345-403, 733-66, 1127-77, 1257-62.59 Hearings, p. 122.
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statement was desirable to assure that the Fund would be used only for
current stabilization operations. It therefore proposed the addition of two
sections to the original Bretton Woods legislation which directed the U.S.
governor and executive directors of the Bank and Fund to obtain official
interpretations of the Articles, and if these interpretations were not satis-
factory, to offer appropriate amendments. In the case of the Bank, they
were directed "to obtain promptly an official interpretation by the Bank as
to its authority to make or guarantee loans for programs of economic
reconstruction and the reconstruction of monetary systems including
long-term stabilization loans." 60 This tactic avoided a reservation, and the
bill was passed by an overwhelming vote.
The Senate hearings and debate followed the same lines. The House
request for an interpretation had removed some of the ABA opposition.
The Senate passed the bill, and the Bretton Woods Agreements Act be-
came law on July 31, 1945. Significantly, on the same day, the Ex-
port-Import Bank was made permanent with increased lending authority.
DISCUSSION IN GREAT BRITAIN
Britain, with the sale of its investments during the war and the need for
reconstruction, faced a choice between continued restrictionism or a return
to multilateralism with U.S. assistance. This problem was discussed in
Parliament and the press. 61 It was recognized here as well. In fact, the
Senate Report on the Bretton Woods agreements had noted the need for
special financial assistance to the U.K. Early in 1945, the U.S. and U.K.
governments began discussions of a large loan in conjunction with the
settlement of lend-lease, Bretton Woods and the proposal for an in-
ternational trade organization. The resulting Anglo-American Financial
Agreement was signed December 6, 1945, subject to ratification. Only then
did the Government submit the bill for acceptance of Bretton Woods to
Parliament, which was passed after short debate, and received the royal
assent on December 20, eleven days before the deadline. 62
SIGNING OF BANK ARTICLES
December 31, 1945, was the final date for acceptance of the Articles.
The U.S. law had authorized acceptance in July, but the U.S. Government
6 Hearings, p. 1278.
6 1For discussions of the debates see RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLO-
MACY, particular pp. 69-253, and R.F. HARROD, THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES,
particularly pp. 525-623.62The Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Commons that the U.K. would withdraw
from the Fund if Congress did not approve the Financial Agreement. (Hansard, 12 December
1945, 14 February 1946.)
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withheld the deposit of its instrument of acceptance until after the action of
Parliament. The United States formally accepted on December 20, 1945,
and other countries which had also taken legislative action previously,
quickly deposited their acceptances. Only Ethiopia had acted sooner (De-
cember 12, 1945).
The Bank and Fund Agreements were formally signed by 28 countries at
a ceremony in the State Department on December 27, 1945, so that the
Articles became effective on that date. Within the next few days, six more
signed, so that by the end of the year a total of $7.6 billion of the capital
was subscribed. 63 Other countries signed later, but not the USSR.
INAUGURAL MEETING, SAVANNAH
At the inaugural meeting of the Fund and Bank in March 1946, the
members were generally represented by one governor for both institutions,
and those which had not yet accepted (including the USSR) sent observers.
The meetings were joint sessions, committees were identical for both and
the reports the same, mutatis mutandis. Drafts of by-laws and necessary
resolutions had been prepared by the United States in consultation with
some fifteen countries, so that there was little controversy except over the
location of the offices and the pay of the Executive Directors.
While the head offices had to be located within the United States accord-
ing to the Articles, the city was not specified. Lord Keynes, supported by
France and India, favored New York as the financial center; it had better
transportation, was farther removed from the diplomatic and political at-
mosphere of Washington and might be more convenient for coordination
with the U.N. (which then had no permanent site but was meeting in New
York). The U.S. representatives argued strongly for Washington on the
grounds that directors could there more easily be in touch with their
governments, economic data would be more readily available, and in any
event the resources would be provided by the government initially and not
the financial market.64 The majority concurred with the U.S. position,
either on the basis of these agruments or in deference to the U.S. view.
65
Keynes was very unhappy about this conclusion. 66
The United States and the U.K. also strongly clashed on the functions
63Cf. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
Report, March 8, 1946, pp. 5-6.64 Draft Minutes of Committee on Site, March 13, 1946.
6IBRD, Inaugural Meeting of the Board of Governors, Selected Documents (May 19,
1946), pp. 50, 61-2.
6Cf. R.F. Harrod, Life of John Maynard Keynes, p. 630, Keynes, in a memorandum of
March 27, 1946, stated that Secretary Vinson had acted on instructions from the President,
though there does not appear to be a written record thereof.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
Negotiation of the International Bank
and remuneration issues. Keynes reopened the argument made at Atlantic
City and Bretton Woods, that the directors should be men holding posi-
tions with their own governments, that they would be needed only occa-
sionally to decide issues since the main work would be carried on by the
Managing Director and President and their staffs. The U.S. representatives
again urged that the directors and alternates would have to be available at
all times for quick decisions, and that they could develop the information
and judgment needed for the business through board discussions. Keynes
also argued that 48 salaries would impose an excessive burden, and that
that number of men could be employed more usefully in their own coun-
tries, and since both Executive Directors and alternates were not needed
all the time, they could divide work and salaries. On the other side, it was
pointed out that in the case of elected directors, their alternates could be
from different countries, so that there would be wider representation if both
were in regular attendance. 67 The compromise reached in the by-laws was
that elected directors would have full time alternates, but provision was
made for proration when one or the other served both the Fund and Bank
or performed only part-time service.
The Governors, Keynes in the negative, voted salaries of $17,000 for
Executive Directors and $11,500 for Alternates, net of taxes, the equiva-
lent, at U.S. income-tax rates, of $25,000 and $15,000 respectively.6 8 The
Savannah meeting also recommended that governments should exempt
from national taxation the salaries of Bank and Fund officers and employ-
ees, parallel to the U.N. recommendation, but the U.S. Government has,
as a matter of policy, refused to grant this exemption.
The election of Executive Directors was complicated by the failure of
the USSR, with the third largest subscription, to accept the Articles. India
was fifth at Savannah, and so could appoint a director, but if the USSR
joined before December 31, 1946, it would be entitled to an appointed
director, so that the result could have been that India would have had
neither an appointed nor an elected director. The matter was settled by
provision for the election of an additional director in that event. 69
The Savannah meeting took a series of non-controversial decisions nec-
essary to establish the Bank as a working institution, such as designating a
67The argument is reported in Draft Minutes of the Committee on Functions and
Remunerations, March 12, 14 and 19. These drafts were not corrected, and may not be
entirely accurate.
68Keynes characterized these rates of pay as "scandalous." In 1946, the U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury was paid a taxable salary of $15,000 and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
£5,000. These salaries were low in terms of private business and some diplomatic services.
69Cf. Selected Documents, pp. 48, 69-70. Since the event never occurred, the com-
plicated arrangement and interpretation need not be detailed here.
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temporary Secretary to secure space, hire staff and expend funds, setting
about May 1, 1946, as the date for the meeting of the Executive Directors,
and designating the U.S. Executive Director as Chairman until a President
took office, adoption of by-laws, referral of questions of interpretation to
the Executive Directors, and making preparations for the regular annual
meeting of the Governors. The President of the International Court of
Justice was designated in the by-laws to appoint the umpire under Article
XVIII(c).
Not recorded in the official records was the understanding that the Bank
President was to be a U.S. national, and the Fund Managing Director a
European. This was a reversal of a rather widely held view that the
arrangement would be the reverse. Secretary Vinson and other Governors
believed that an American would be preferable for the Bank since borrow-
ing in the American market, the only prospective resource beyond the U.S.
subscription, would require familiarity with the operations in the market
and the confidence of the financial community. 70 .
Shortly after the meeting, the Acting Secretary rented quarters at 1818
H. Street in Washington, and this has continued to be the Bank's address.
A skeleton staff was recruited. The Executive Board held its first meeting
on May 7, the first President, Eugene Meyer, took office on June 18, and
on June 25, the Bank announced that it was ready to begin operations, and
called on the members for their capital subscriptions.
7 0This practice has since been followed.
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